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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case, we must determine whether an epileptic, 
who controls his disability with medication, can maintain 
an employment discrimination action without showing he 
satisfied his employer's expectations or showing favorable 
treatment of non-disabled employees by the employer. We 
hold that such an individual can present a prima facie case 
of employment discrimination and therefore should survive 
a motion for summary judgment. 
 
We will reverse the judgment of the district court as to 
this claim and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Matczak began working for 
defendant-appellee Frankford Candy and Chocolate 
Company ("Frankford") in April 1993 as a Maintenance 
Supervisor. After about ninety days, Matczak was 
reassigned to the position of Building Maintenance 
Supervisor. The duties of this position included maintaining 
Frankford's facilities and supervising two mechanics. In 
November 1993, Matczak suffered an epileptic seizure at 
work and was hospitalized for seventeen days. He had been 
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diagnosed with epilepsy almost thirty years earlier but had 
controlled the condition with medication and had never 
experienced a seizure prior to this incident. 
 
Matczak's doctor put him on a new medication for about 
five and a half months and restricted his physical activities 
for that period of time. The doctor sent a note to Matczak's 
superiors at Frankford, informing them of the restrictions 
on Matczak's activities. The note stated: "Mr. Matczak is 
under my care and cannot at present work around moving 
machinery, operate a vehicle or work at heights. He can, 
however, effectively supervise this type of work by others. 
. . . This applies for the next 5 1/2 month[s.]" Appendix at 
51a. Upon his return to work in December, Frankford 
placed Matczak on restricted duty and assigned various 
tasks to him which were not prohibited by his doctor (e.g., 
creating a computer inventory of machinery parts). In April 
1994, Frankford fired Matczak. Frankford's reasons for 
firing Matczak are unclear since it has offered two 
conflicting explanations: (1) Matczak was fired because "he 
did not adequately perform the tasks he was given after he 
returned to work" and (2) Matczak was fired because 
"business was slow . . . and his job was being eliminated." 
Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Company, 950 
F. Supp. 693, 695 (E.D. Pa. 1997). Matczak claims these 
explanations serve as pretext for the real reason he was 
fired: because he has epilepsy. 
 
Matczak brought suit against Frankford in district court 
for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
S 951 et seq.1 Matczak also made claims of negligent and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), Frankford moved for 
summary judgment as to all claims. The district court 
granted the motion, finding that (1) Matczak was not 
actually disabled under the ADA; (2) even if a jury 
considered Matczak "regarded as" disabled by his employer, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although we will only discuss the ADA claim, any analysis applied to 
the ADA claim applies equally to the PHRA claim. Kelly v. Drexel 
University, 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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he had not presented requisite elements of a prima facie 
case of employment discrimination; and (3) the negligent 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims were 
without merit. 
 
II. 
 
The ADA prohibits discrimination by an employer 
"against a qualified individual with a disability because of 
the disability of such individual in regard to job application 
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other 
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12112(a). The ADA defines a "disability" as: "(A) a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of 
such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment." 42 U.S.C. S 12102(2). A "qualified individual 
with a disability" is an individual "with a disability who, 
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform 
the essential functions of the employment position that 
such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. S 12111(8). 
 
Before the district court, Matczak claimed protection 
under the ADA because his epilepsy is a physical 
impairment substantially limiting major life activities. 
Alternatively, Matczak claimed that, even if his impairment 
is not substantially limiting, Frankford regarded him as 
being substantially limited by it. Matczak made no claim 
that he had satisfied Frankford's expectations with regard 
to his performance or that Frankford had treated employees 
outside the ADA's protected class more favorably. 
 
The district court acknowledged that Matczak's epilepsy 
would constitute a physical impairment under the ADA but 
found that the impairment did not substantially limit any 
major life functions other than "some manual tasks, such 
as climbing heights or working around machinery." 
Matczak, 950 F. Supp. at 696. The district court also 
concluded that the impairment could not be "severe or 
permanent" because the condition was only to last 
"approximately six months." Id. However, noting that a jury 
could conclude Matczak was "regarded as" disabled by 
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Frankford, the district court turned to Matczak's prima 
facie case of discrimination. Id. at 697. The district court 
determined that a prima facie case required a showing that 
the employer's legitimate expectations were met and that 
employees outside the protected class received favorable 
treatment. Id. Since Matczak did not present evidence of 
these two elements, the district court ruled that he did not 
present a prima facie case of employment discrimination. 
Id. The district court also found no evidence to support 
Matczak's claims of negligent and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Id. Based on these conclusions, the 
district court granted Frankford's motion for summary 
judgment. Id. 
 
III. 
 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. We exercise plenary review over a district court's 
grant of summary judgment. Olson v. General Electric 
Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996). We apply the 
same test the district court should have applied in the first 
instance. Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank, New 
Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). We must therefore 
determine whether the record, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to Matczak, shows that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that Frankford was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex 
Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Brewer 
v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corporation, 72 F.3d 326, 329- 
30 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
IV. 
 
We first consider the district court's conclusions with 
regard to Matczak's ADA claims. As to these claims, the 
district court concluded that: (1) Matczak could not claim 
to be actually disabled under the ADA; and (2) Matczak 
could claim to be "regarded as" disabled but did not present 
a prima facie case of discrimination. We will address each 
of these assessments in turn. 
 
                                5 
  
A. 
 
The district court determined that Matczak's impairment 
did not substantially limit major life activities because he 
was only restricted from participating in a small number of 
activities and would only be restricted to that degree for a 
few months. This reasoning is flawed; it confuses the 
disease with its treatment. 
 
Matczak's doctor did not predict that his epilepsy would 
be cured in five and a half months. He merely prescribed 
certain medication and prohibited specific activities for that 
period. Appendix at 51a. The logical inference is that, after 
that period, the doctor expected Matczak to resume living 
with epilepsy as he had for most of the past three decades. 
The record only indicates that the restrictions and course of 
medication were to last five and a half months. No evidence 
supports the conclusion that Matczak's epilepsy would have 
been cured after that period. 
 
Furthermore, although the district court correctly 
observed that Matczak can engage in most life activities, it 
neglected to note that he can only do so with the assistance 
of medication. Matczak has lived a relatively normal life in 
spite of his epilepsy, but he has done so by taking 
medication to control the condition. Appendix at 30a. 
 
The ADA itself does not say whether mitigating measures 
should be considered in determining whether a given 
impairment substantially limits one or more of the major 
life activities of an individual. Nonetheless, we do receive 
guidance from two other sources. First, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has set 
forth interpretive guidelines for the ADA that state, "The 
determination of whether an individual is substantially 
limited in a major life activity must be made . . . without 
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or 
assistive or prosthetic devices." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App. 
S 1630.2(j). Although we are not bound by the EEOC's 
guidelines, we do afford its interpretation a great deal of 
deference since Congress charged the EEOC with issuing 
regulations to implement the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. S 12116; 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (stating deference is 
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"accorded to an [agency's] construction of a statutory 
scheme it is entrusted to administer"). The EEOC's 
guidelines constitute an appendix to the regulations and 
therefore do not command the same degree of deference as 
the regulations themselves. See Appalachian States Low- 
Level Radioactive Waste Commission v. O'Leary, 93 F.3d 
103, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that interpretive rules, 
which are not subject to public notice and comment 
procedures, merely clarify regulations but are not meant to 
alter legal rights). Still, we must give the EEOC's 
interpretation of its own regulations "controlling weight 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation[s]." Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 
U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Company, 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). 
 
Our second source of guidance is the legislative history of 
the ADA. An examination of that history reveals Congress' 
intent to exclude mitigating measures from assessments of 
disability. One congressional committee noted, "[P]ersons 
with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which 
substantially limit a major life activity are covered under 
the first prong of disability, even if the effects of the 
impairment are controlled by medication." H.R. R EP. No. 
101-485(II), at 52 (1990) (emphasis added), reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 334; see also S. REP . No. 101-116, at 23 
(1989) (committee report stating "whether a person has a 
disability should be assessed without regard to the 
availability of mitigating measures . . ."). Thus, the ADA's 
legislative history bolsters the interpretation offered by the 
EEOC's guidelines. That is, disabled individuals who 
control their disability with medication may still invoke the 
protections of the ADA. 
 
Based on the guidance provided by the EEOC's 
interpretive guidelines and the ADA's own legislative 
history, we hold that the district court erred in deciding 
that Matczak could not be considered "disabled" under the 
ADA. The district court improperly determined the severity 
and permanence of Matczak's epilepsy based on the 
relatively short duration of the restrictions imposed. Also, 
the district court failed to acknowledge that the normalcy of 
Matczak's life had been attained through the use of 
 
                                7 
  
medication. To be clear, we must stress that Matczak 
cannot be considered disabled merely because he is 
epileptic. Some individuals suffer from relatively mild forms 
of epilepsy which cause nothing more than "minor isolated 
muscle jerks" -- so we cannot and do not conclude that all 
epileptics are substantially limited by the impairment. 
Lewis P. Rowland, ed., Merritt's Textbook of Neurology 850 
(9th ed. 1995). We simply hold that whether Matczak is 
disabled or not constitutes a genuine issue of material fact 
better left for resolution by a jury. Matczak's claim that he 
suffered discrimination because he is actually disabled 
should not have been dismissed as a matter of law. 
 
B. 
 
Turning to Matczak's alternative claim that Frankford 
discriminated against him because it regarded him as 
disabled, the district court found that this claim could not 
go to trial because Matczak had not presented a prima facie 
case of employment discrimination. The district court based 
this decision on Matczak's failure to show that (1) "his work 
performance met the employer's legitimate job expectations" 
and (2) "employees not in the protected class were treated 
more favorably." Matczak, 950 F. Supp. at 697. 
 
When considering ADA cases in which the employee 
alleges the reasons for dismissal serve as pretext for the 
employer's unlawful discrimination, we derive our analytical 
framework from the Supreme Court's opinion in McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See, 
e.g., Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 156 
n.3 (3d Cir. 1995) (employing McDonnell Douglas framework 
in review of ADA claim). According to that framework, the 
employee must first prove "by the preponderance of the 
evidence a prima facie case of discrimination." Id. Next, if 
the employee presents a prima facie case, the employer 
must "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the employee's [termination]." McDonnell Douglas, 411 
U.S. at 802. Finally, if the employer articulates such a 
reason, the employee must have an opportunity to prove 
that the proffered reason for termination "was in fact 
pretext." Id. at 804. 
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In applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to this 
case, the dispositive issue becomes whether the two 
elements the district court found lacking are necessary to 
present a prima facie case of employment discrimination. 
Under McDonnell Douglas, a prima facie case has four 
general elements: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a 
protected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the job; (3) 
the plaintiff was terminated despite those qualifications; 
and (4) after the termination, the job remained open and 
the employer sought applicants with the plaintiff's 
qualifications. 411 U.S. at 802. Yet, the McDonnell Douglas 
Court cautioned that there is no rigid formulation of a 
prima facie case and the requirements may vary with 
"differing factual situations." 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. Accord 
Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 494 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1995). Therefore, we cannot enumerate every possible 
element of a prima facie case due to the factual vagaries 
that distinguish all cases. Nonetheless, we can determine 
whether specific elements are required in every prima facie 
employment discrimination case. Turning to the two 
elements mentioned by the district court, an examination of 
the case law reveals that neither element is required to 
present a prima facie case. 
 
The first element the district court found lacking was 
satisfaction of the employer's expectations. Determining 
whether Matczak satisfied his employer's expectations is, by 
its very nature, a subjective assessment. Obviously, we 
cannot evaluate an employer's expectations to see if they 
have been satisfied as we can objective measures such as, 
say, educational requirements. In light of this fact, our past 
rulings prevent satisfaction of an employer's expectations 
from being a requisite element of a prima facie employment 
discrimination case. We have held that "while objective job 
qualifications should be considered in evaluating the 
plaintiff 's prima facie case, the question of whether an 
employee possesses a subjective quality . . . is better left to 
the later stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis." Weldon 
v. Kraft, 896 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1990). The rationale 
behind this position is that "subjective evaluations `are 
more susceptible of abuse and more likely to mask 
pretext' " and, for that reason, are better examined at the 
pretext stage than at the prima facie stage. Id. (quoting 
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Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 F.2d 59, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
Accord Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
 
The district court found Matczak objectively qualified for 
his position because Frankford "admitted that the essential 
function of [Matczak's] job is that of supervising and that 
. . . task could be done without requiring [Matczak] to 
perform any of the activities prohibited by his doctor." 
Matczak, 950 F. Supp. at 697. At the prima facie stage, the 
district court should have made no further inquiry 
concerning Matczak's qualifications. Once it concluded that 
Matczak was objectively qualified for the job, the district 
court should not have required Matczak to demonstrate 
that his performance met his employer's subjective 
expectations. 
 
The other element of a prima facie case the district court 
found lacking was favorable treatment of employees outside 
the protected class. Under McDonnell Douglas, evidence of 
favorable treatment outside the protected class is not an 
element of a prima facie case. 411 U.S. at 802. Yet, as 
noted earlier, we have heeded the Court's direction not to 
impose the prima facie requirements woodenly. See 
Waldron, 56 F.3d at 494 n.3 (citing, among others, 
McDonnell Douglas). Unfortunately, a necessary by-product 
of this flexible approach is the absence of clear guidance 
as to whether favorable treatment outside the protected 
class is a necessary element. In several employment 
discrimination cases, we have listed such favorable 
treatment as an element of a prima facie case.2 See, e.g., 
Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company, 100 
F.3d 1061, 1066 n.5 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding 
plaintiff must show position was filled by someone outside 
protected class), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2532 (1997); 
Weldon, 896 F.2d at 797 (holding plaintiff must show 
"others not in the protected class were treated more 
favorably"); Lawrence, 98 F.3d at 68 (holding plaintiff must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Frankford contends that we have already disposed of this issue in 
Kelly. However, in Kelly, we affirmed a district court's grant of summary 
judgment in an employment discrimination case but did not refer to the 
elements of a prima facie case at all. 
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show replacement by "person sufficiently outside protected 
class to create an inference of discrimination"). However, we 
have also rendered opinions in employment discrimination 
cases without ever mentioning this element as part of a 
prima facie case. See, e.g., Waldron, 56 F.3d at 494 
(holding plaintiff need only show she or he was qualified 
member of protected class who lost position under 
circumstances giving rise to inference of discrimination); 
Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 990 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(listing only McDonnell Douglas elements of prima facie 
case); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(same). 
 
Fortunately, we have taken a step towards avoiding any 
potential confusion. In Olson, we held that a prima facie 
case basically comprised the four elements enunciated in 
McDonnell Douglas, i.e., (1) the plaintiff belongs to the 
protected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified; (3) the 
plaintiff was rejected or fired; and (4) after the rejection or 
firing, the employer sought applicants with the plaintiff's 
qualifications. 101 F.3d at 951. Yet we further held that, as 
"an alternative to the fourth element of the McDonnell 
Douglas scenario," the plaintiff could show that the position 
was filled "with a person not belonging to the protected 
category." Id. By holding that favorable treatment outside 
the protected class is an "alternative" element to a prima 
facie case, we made clear that this element can be present 
but by no means must be present. 
 
Two points should be noted about Olson. First, the case 
is particularly illuminating because it is the only one in 
which we have discussed this issue explicitly. The 
previously mentioned cases merely list elements of a prima 
facie case, but none addresses in detail whether favorable 
treatment outside the protected class is required for every 
employment discrimination claim. Second, Olson  should 
not be read as overruling or even conflicting with any of our 
decisions that list this element as part of a prima facie 
case. Olson simply elucidates the directive of the Supreme 
Court that one prima facie standard cannot apply"in every 
respect to differing factual situations." McDonnell Douglas, 
411 U.S. at 802 n.13. Olson does not suggest that favorable 
treatment outside the protected class is an inappropriate 
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element of a prima facie case. Quite the contrary, Olson 
endorses this element -- but only as an alternative. Thus, 
Olson stands in complete harmony with the cases listing 
such favorable treatment as an element of a prima facie 
case. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in 
requiring Matczak to show that employees beyond the 
ADA's protection were treated more favorably than he was. 
 
V. 
 
Turning to Matczak's claims of negligent and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, we hold that the district 
court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of 
Frankford as to these claims. Both claims are state tort 
claims governed by the substantive law of Pennsylvania. 
Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 394 (3d Cir. 
1988). Initially, we must note that Pennsylvania's workers' 
compensation statute provides the sole remedy "for injuries 
allegedly sustained during the course of employment." 
Dugan v. Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania, 876 F. Supp. 713, 
723 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (citing 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 481(a)). 
The exclusivity provision of that statute bars claims for 
"intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress 
[arising] out of [an] employment relationship." Id. at 724. 
 
Even absent the statute, Matczak's claims do not rise to 
the level required for a finding of either negligent or 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. A plaintiff must 
allege some form of bodily harm to maintain a claim of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Simmons v. 
Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 238 (Pa. 1996). The only harm 
Matczak claims is that he cries at least once a week since 
he was fired. Appendix at 102a. Crying may be a 
manifestation of emotional distress, but it hardly 
constitutes physical harm. As for the claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, Matczak must show that his 
employer's conduct was of an "extreme or outrageous type." 
Cox, 861 F.2d at 395 (quoting Rinehimer v. Luzerne County 
Community College, 539 A.2d 1298, 1305 (Pa. Super. 
1988)). We have noted that "it is extremely rare to find 
conduct in the employment context that will rise to the level 
of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery 
for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress." 
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Id. (citation omitted). Matczak has alleged conduct which, 
while possibly discriminatory, could not be considered 
"extreme or outrageous." The exclusivity provision of 
Pennsylvania's workers' compensation statute and the fact 
that Matczak's underlying emotional distress claims seem 
without merit indicate the district court's grant of summary 
judgment was proper as to these claims. 
 
VI. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the grant of 
summary judgment as to Matczak's claims of negligent and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. We will reverse 
the grant of summary judgment as to the ADA claims and 
remand to the district court for further proceedings. 
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